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Culture and the Rise of ‘‘Pop Nationalism’’
in Korea
J E O N G S U K J O O
T
HIS ARTICLE AIMS TO EXAMINE THE SURGE OF POPULAR NATIONALISM IN
Korea concerning the recent transnational advance of South
Korean (hereafter Korean) popular culture.1 Since Korea has
never enjoyed regional as well as international acclaim for its popular
culture, the transnational recognition of its pop culture has become a
point of national pride in Korea. In this context, the article will first
present a brief overview of the transformation of Korean popular cul-
ture from an obscure cultural backwater to a new fountain of trendy
entertainment in Asia. Then, it will examine how transnationalization
of Korean popular culture has been largely seen in Korea within na-
tionalistic discourses and interests or ‘‘pop nationalism.’’
The idea of pop nationalism is inspired by what Koichi Iwabuchi
called ‘‘trans/nationalism.’’ He coined this term to refer to the nation-
alistic ways in which the export of Japanese popular culture is discussed
in Japan (18). With the rise of similar nationalistic discourses in Korea
concerning transnationalizing Korean popular culture, this article aims
to examine it as specific to the Korean context. It will point out the
ironies and ambiguities of pop nationalism and the need to recognize
the continuing active role of nation-states and nationalism in shaping
cultural experiences of globalization. In addition, despite the nation-
alistic rhetoric, the article will point out that Korean popular culture is
a site of the global – local encounter and interaction.
Historically, Korea has been concerned more about the influx
of foreign cultures—be it Chinese, Japanese, or American—than the
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advance of its own. Hence, the opening up of the Korean market to
global forces had long been accompanied by the fear of foreign cultural
invasion in Korea, a fear often amplified by the uncertainty of the
competitiveness of Korean popular culture. For example, with the un-
hindered import of Hollywood films since the late 1980s when Korea
liberalized its market under the pressure from the US government,
Korea has had its share of emotional charges against ‘‘American cultural
imperialism.’’ Similarly, the Korean government’s decision to gradually
lift the ban on Japanese popular culture in 1998—imposed since Ko-
rea’s liberation from the Japanese colonial rule in 1945—predictably
provoked the fear of being swamped by more competitive Japanese pop
culture. Cultural globalization has been largely received in Korea
within this context. According to C. Fred Alford, globalization—
symbolizing the market liberalization in Korea—is experienced by
Koreans as ‘‘posing the gravest danger to the self, the danger of be-
coming other to one’s self, self’s stranger’’ (12). Thus, Alford argues
that most discussion of globalization in Korea has the aura of fear.
Even when Koreans seem to embrace globalization, it is to keep it at
bay (12, 148).
Considering this longstanding concern with the influence of for-
eign cultures and the reception of globalization within this tradition,
something quite puzzling and even anomalous has been happening
in Korean popular culture. Reminiscent of its ‘‘compressed moder-
nity,’’ which squeezed social changes into a few years, Korea has
successfully reinvented itself within the past several years from an
obscure cultural backwater to a new center of cultural production in
Asia. Dubbed as the ‘‘Korean Wave’’ in Asia, Korean popular culture
has increasingly defined ‘‘what the disparate people in East Asia
watch, listen to and play’’ (Onishi, ‘‘Roll Over’’ A3). Korea has be-
come a ‘‘Blockbuster Nation,’’ ‘‘beating Hollywood’’ at home and
garnering critical as well as commercial acclaim abroad (Russell and
Wehrfritz). Meanwhile, Korean stars are mobbed like big Hollywood
stars throughout Asia and people flock to Korea to visit locations
where their favorite shows were filmed, giving an unexpected boost
to tourism. Even in Japan where Hollywood stars once fetched big
money by pushing various commodities on commercials, Asian stars
and celebrities are increasingly embraced, the catalyst for which
has been its newly found love affair with Korean popular culture
(Wallace A4).
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Shunned by its own people at home and practically unknown out-
side its border, the current ascendancy of Korean popular culture in
Asia was inconceivable in the early 1990s. For example, the Korean
film industry seemed to be almost dead amid onslaught from Hol-
lywood films, taking only 15.9% of the national market in 1993, down
from 34.2% in 1985, just before the market liberalization in Korea.
The Korean music industry fared a little better than the film industry,
with international pop and rock music taking 60% of the Korean
market in the early 1990s. In addition, between 1993 and 1996, three
major terrestrial broadcasters in Korea—KBS, MBC, and SBS—im-
ported a total of US$99.5 million, while their export was only
US$19.7 million. The United States accounted for 68.3% of the total
import in 1996 (Koh M34). In this context, exporting Korean cultural
contents was something least expected, and, with their export amount
so negligible, the Korean government could not provide an estimate
until the late 1990s (Onishi, ‘‘Roll Over’’ A3).
However, with what seemed to be the coming of age of Korean
popular culture, the situation dramatically reversed by the late 1990s.
For example, local Korean pop music had 60% of the domestic music
market by the late 1990s. With this share growing further, Savannah
Hahn, deputy managing director of Sony Music Korea, said in 2001,
‘‘we’ve been left with no choice but to go local’’ in Korea (qtd. in Yoon
94). In addition, the Korean film industry began to churn out films
combining local themes and Hollywood-style production values from
the late 1990s. Its Korean market share skyrocketed from 25% in 1998
to 39.7% in 1999, and has hovered around, or even over, 50% since
then. Thus, almost overnight Korea became one of the few countries
with a vibrant film industry that has successfully challenged the dom-
inant position of Hollywood films in the local market. Korean content
also came to dominate primetime on terrestrial TV channels. Foreign
programs, when imported, are largely relegated to unpopular hours,
typically drawing only a fraction of 20 – 30% in the ratings often
enjoyed by Korean dramas.
While largely replacing foreign content at home, Korean popular
culture soon began to play an increasingly visible role in transnational
markets. The Korean singer, BoA, who debuted in Japan in 2001 at the
age of 14, has topped Japan’s Oricon pop music charts several times,
and other Korean pop singers and bands have become household names
throughout Asia. What especially initially gave an edge to K-pop
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(as Korean music is known in Asia) was localized hip-hop that toned
down the harsh beats of the American genre and dealt with issues more
resonant with the Asian youth (Yoon 92 – 93). Meanwhile, there has
also been an exponential growth in the export sales of Korean films.
While total export sales of Korean films were a meager US$472,000 in
1997, they leaped to US$11 million in 2001, to US$31 million in
2003, and to US$58 million in 2004. With the Asian market ac-
counting for 77.8% of the total film export in 2004, Korean films have
become a key commercial component in the region (Korean Film
Council 13). In addition, if one-way traffic previously characterized the
film trade between the United States and Korea, the boom in Korean
films has resulted in several Korean films being picked up by Hol-
lywood majors and independent distributors for limited releases as well
as for remakes in the United States.2
However, serialized Korean TV dramas called mini-series—running
typically from sixteen to twenty-four episodes, with each episode last-
ing about fifty minutes—have been the major driving force of the
Korean Wave. Often compared with soap operas and characterized by
emotional story lines centering on families and/or heart-wrenching love
stories, Korean TV dramas were initially considered as cheap alterna-
tives to their Japanese counterparts. For example, in 2000, Taiwanese
Gala TV paid US$1,000 for an hour of a Korean drama compared with
US$15,000 – 20,000 for a Japanese one. Yet, these days a Korean TV
drama outperforms its Japanese counterpart, between US$7,000 and
US$15,000, compared with between US$6,000 and US$12,000 for a
Japanese one (Onishi, ‘‘Roll Over’’ A3).
In Hong Kong, Taejanggu˘m/Jewel in the Palace, a drama about an
orphan girl who became a court cook and then the royal physician
during Korea’s Chosun Dynasty five hundred years ago, set a new
record in the ratings, notching 47% (Chung 82). According to the
Korean National Tourism Organization, Korean dramas accounted for
over 25% of all foreign dramas in 2003 and 2004 in China, where they
were first imported in the mid-1990s (Russell, ‘‘Wave’’ 17). Korean
popular culture even found itself in the most unlikely place, North
Korea, where copies of South Korean dramas and music smuggled from
China are watched and listened to ‘‘in violation of laws against the
import of enemy culture’’ (Demick A4).
Yet, nowhere is the sudden fervor for Korean popular culture more
surprising than in Japan, given the tumultuous relationship between
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Japan and Korea. For example, the Japanese colonization of Korea from
1910 to 1945 and what in Korea is seen as Japan’s attempts to cover up
its imperial history, to name just the least, have contributed to an
uneasy relationship between the two countries. In addition, the mem-
ory and legacy of forceful assimilation during the Japanese colonization
have made many Koreans fearful of Japanization as much as Amer-
icanization, especially as Japan’s already significant economic power
was coupled with the rise of its popular culture in Asia during the
1990s, Japan was often viewed as the ‘‘America of Asia’’ in Korea (Choi
146). In this context, the lift of the ban on Japanese popular culture in
1998 provoked a grim warning of another Japanese cultural assimi-
lation in Korea. While Japan, on its part, did not impose any ban on
Korean popular culture, it mostly remained indifferent to its former
colony, which was seen as inferior both racially and economically.
However, Korean fears of another cultural assimilation by Japan
proved to be largely unwarranted. While award-winning Japanese
films, the first category allowed to be imported, generally underper-
formed in Korea amid competitive local films, Korean popular culture
has found a receptive market in Japan.3 For example, Swiri/Swiri (aka
Shiri), a Korean blockbuster which signaled the renaissance of the
Korean film industry, became the first Korean film to open nationwide
in Japan in 2000, grossing over US$15 million. Kongdong Kyo˘ngbi
Kuyo˘k JSA/Joint Security Area, another Korean film released a year later,
also did well, earning over US$10 million at the box office in Japan.
Thus, Japan alone accounted for 43.8% (or US$6.58 million) of the
total export revenue of Korean films in 2002 (Korean Film Commis-
sion 15). However, despite the success of a few Korean films and
singers, the Korean Wave, which was sweeping across other East Asian
countries by this time, remained relatively calm in Japan.
Then, all of sudden, Kyo˘ul Yo˘n’ga/Winter Sonata, a Korean TV drama
about ‘‘pure’’ or ‘‘true’’ love amid countless obstacles and convoluted
plots, jumpstarted the Korean Wave in Japan on an unprecedented
scale. First aired on Japan’s NHK satellite channel in 2003, and again
on NHK terrestrial channel in 2004, Winter Sonata absolutely mes-
merized middle-aged Japanese women. While Korean dramas often
offer a glimpse of a modern lifestyle to the aspiring Chinese, Winter
Sonata struck a chord with these women’s nostalgia and yearning for
how they think things used to be in Japan. For these women, the male
character of the drama as well as the actor, Bae Yong Joon, who played
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the role, represents ‘‘old-fashioned virtues’’—qualities of being gentle,
sincere, sensitive, and caring—that contemporary Japanese men seem
to lack. Thus, in November 2004, when Bae—affectionately called
‘‘Yon-sama’’ (sama is an honorific reserved for Japanese royalty) in Ja-
pan—visited the country, thousands of his female fans greeted him at
the airport to get a glimpse of him. In addition, almost everything
related to the show—the original soundtrack, the novel based on the
script, mufflers and glasses worn by Bae, and even wigs modeled after
Bae’s hairstyle in the drama—became hot sellers, resulting in US$2.3
billion in economic activities between Japan and Korea (Onishi,
‘‘What’s Korean’’ A3).
The success of Winter Sonata has led to the sudden boom of Korean
popular culture in Japan, turning several Korean actors into superstars
and fueling further demand for Korean popular culture. Japan’s
fascination with all things Korean, Korean films have become ‘‘the
hottest ticket in town,’’ commanding ever higher prices (Schwarzacher
18). For example, Oech’ul/April Snow, a Korean film starring none other
than Bae, was sold to Japan for US$7 million at its preproduction stage
in early 2005, easily topping the previous US$3.2 million presale
record for a Korean film (Russell, ‘‘Korea’’ 12). Japan’s share of the total
export revenue of Korean films likewise skyrocketed from 44.8% (or
US$13.8 million) in 2003 to 69.3% (or US$40.4 million) in 2004
(Korean Film Council 14). The Korean Wave in Japan has grown so
strong that it is said to even crowd out US independent films and
European films in theaters, and also negatively affect the market for
American TV programs (Chung 88).
Since foreign or transnational popular culture in Asia has often been
associated with America, Japan, or Hong Kong, the sudden rise of Ko-
rean popular culture took many people in Asia by surprise. For example,
concerning Japan’s sudden embrace of Asian, especially Korean, talent in
the wake of the Yon-sama craze, Tomoko Kamiguchi of Dentsu Casting
& Entertainment admits that ‘‘five years ago, two years ago even, I could
never have imagined this happening’’ (qtd. in Wallace A4). However, no
one seems to be more puzzled by and least prepared for the ascendancy of
Korean popular culture in Asia than Koreans themselves. This is because
Koreans have always been concerned about the influx of foreign cultures
and never expected their popular culture to be liked outside Korea.
To many Koreans, witnessing the transnational advance of Korean
popular culture for the first time indeed came as a surprise. Thus, when
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the Korean media first reported the growing fervor for Korean popular
culture in Asia in early 2001, some Korean people were initially
skeptical of these reports, often doubting the validity of reports or
seeing the popularity of Korean popular culture as a passing fad. In
addition, Koreans seem to have trouble explaining the sudden ascen-
dancy of Korean popular culture, presenting rather absurd answers. For
example, regarding the Yon-sama craze in Japan, Youn Jung Suk, a
‘‘specialist’’ on Korean – Japan relations at the Sejong Institute in Ko-
rea, reasons that Japanese women were ‘‘genetically predisposed’’ to like
Bae. This is because he is from Pusan, a city located in the southeastern
part of Korea, where many Japanese originally came from (qtd. in
Onishi, ‘‘What’s Korean’’ A3).
However, despite its newness, the Korean Wave phenomenon has
quickly discredited the argument that Korea is threatened by foreign
cultural invasion. Certainly, it is difficult for Koreans to maintain this
argument, when Korean popular culture has made a huge imprint in
many Asian countries. For example, in the wake of Winter Sonata in
Japan, there has been surging interest in learning the Korean language,
boosted by NHK’s decision to use material from the drama for its
Korean language course. In Hong Kong, people eat the kinds of food
introduced in Jewel in the Palace and parents are dressing their children
up in Korean traditional costumes (Chung 82). Korean stars are cred-
ited for establishing Korean ethnic features as a standard of beauty
across Asia, with women in the region having their faces changed
following their favorite Korean stars (Fairclough A8).
The Korean Wave phenomenon has also meant palpable economic
spin-offs. Korea has suddenly emerged as one of the most popular
tourist destinations, as TV dramas have brought in a spate of the
‘‘Korean Wave tourists’’ from various corners of Asia. Owing to the
‘‘pilgrimage’’ to Winter Sonata locations in Korea, Japanese tourism to
Korea alone increased by 40% during the first ten months of 2004
(Onishi, ‘‘What’s Korean’’ A3). The number of Taiwanese tourists to
Korea also increased from 108,831 in 2000 to 298,325 in 2003, de-
spite the general decline in overseas travel in Taiwan during the same
period (Onishi, ‘‘Roll Over’’ A3). In order to meet the surging demand
to visit Korea, the direct flight between Taiwan and Korea, which was
discontinued when Korea switched its recognition from Taiwan to
China in 1992, was resumed in September 2004 (AFP). In addition,
Mark Youn of CJ Entertainment, Korea’s leading media company,
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credited the Korean Wave for making such Korean brands as ‘‘Hyundai
cars and Samsung mobile phones more fashionable’’ (qtd. in Ward 12).
Given these economic and cultural reverberations of the Korean
Wave, Andrew Ward of the Financial Times argues that Korean popular
culture is staging its own version of ‘‘cultural imperialism by expand-
ing into neighboring Asian markets’’ (12). Since globalization was
largely feared as the influx of foreign cultures in Korea, this dramatic
reversal of fortune for Korean popular culture presents a unique and
fertile ground to critically reexamine globalization. For example, with
Korean popular culture increasingly flowing out, the Korean Wave
phenomenon is one of the latest examples refuting the view that
equates globalization with an undisrupted advance of American pop-
ular culture. What is interesting in this regard is that it is often
indigenized and hybrid versions of American popular culture—hip-
hop, the blockbuster, and soap operas—which came to not only replace
foreign cultural contents in Korea, but also build up export profiles of
Korean popular culture in Asia. Thus, instead of Americanization,
intensified global flows of American popular culture have come to
unsettle its own hegemony by inadvertently invigorating local popular
culture industries.
However, rather than critical reexamination of globalization, na-
tionalistic fear of foreign cultural invasion is largely replaced by equally
nationalistic pride in the transnational advance of Korean popular
culture, or pop nationalism, which views the Korean Wave phenom-
enon within nationalistic discourses and interests. For example, the
Korean Wave is lauded for helping enhance images of Korea as refined
and sophisticated and for spreading the awareness of Korea and its
culture across Asia and beyond. Ban Ki Moon, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Trade in Korea, said that the Korean Wave has brought the
country ‘‘long-overdue respect,’’ since Korea’s soft power is now in-
creasingly matching its economic sway as the 11th largest economy in
the world. Yang Kee Ho, a professor in Korea, similarly comments that
‘‘the Korean Wave shows we’re not just a small country anymore’’ (qtd.
in Spaeth and Macintyre).
Given these nationalistic tones concerning the Korean Wave phe-
nomenon, it is no wonder that Bae is considered in Korea as something
like ‘‘a national treasure’’ or, as one old Korean woman put it, a ‘‘true
patriot’’ for improving the nation’s image as well as its relations with
Japan (Demick A4). Reflecting this public sentiment, while popular
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culture was long looked down upon in Korea as a low form of culture
with vulgar influence, and ‘‘traditional’’ Korean culture was often pre-
sented as the culture of Korea, Korean popular culture is now regarded
as a valuable vehicle for spreading Korean culture. An official at the
Korean National Tourism Organization articulates this changing view
by arguing that ‘‘popular culture is also very precious and should be
treated accordingly’’ (Demick A5).
The Korean media not only echoes, but also fuels the nationalistic
euphoria and celebration concerning the Korean Wave phenomenon.
Stories of how Korean popular culture makes headway in foreign box
offices and small screens, and how Korean stars are met with adoring
crowds in many Asian countries, have taken the center stage in Korean
media. The coverage of the Korean Wave phenomenon by foreign,
especially western, media—New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Fi-
nancial Times, to name just a few—and comments on Korean films by
internationally recognized figures have similarly made headlines in the
Korean media. Not surprisingly, there were commotions in the Korean
media, when Jang Dong Gun, for the first time as a Korean actor,
decorated the cover of Time Asia for the week of November 14, 2005.
In addition, the Korean media proudly report that Korean stars have
been courted by transnational brands—such as Christian Dior, Louis
Vuitton, and Lancoˆme—to be their Asian faces.
The Korean Wave, however, does not always mean kudos for Korean
popular culture and stars, since it has also triggered the growing un-
easiness with the Korean Wave phenomenon in Asia. As one concerned
scholar notes, much like Koreans in the late 1980s when they charged
against American cultural imperialism, the Chinese and Vietnamese are
now critical of the Korean Wave as cultural imperialism (Pak). Indeed,
in Vietnam where fashion-conscious young Vietnamese eagerly
embraced what they identified as ‘‘Seoul fashion’’—the darker makeup
colors, thinly shaved eyebrows, and square-toed shoes—the Korean
Wave was voted as ‘‘one of the 10 most embarrassing cultural events’’ of
2001 by one of its national newspapers (Visser A23). China recently
announced its plan to restrict the import of Korean dramas to the
country from 2006. The Taiwanese government also has been consid-
ering the idea of slapping a tax on Korean content (Onishi, ‘‘Roll Over’’
A3). In Japan, a comic book titled Hating the Korean Wave has become
an unexpected best seller, even to the surprise of the book’s editors
(Onishi, ‘‘Ugly Images’’ A6).
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However, in popular discourses in Korea, the uneasiness with the
Korean Wave is often conveniently interpreted as envy of the growing
acclaim for Korean popular culture or the sense of crisis felt by some
Asian countries—notably China and Japan—since their position as a
cultural hegemon in the region is threatened by the Korean Wave.
While there is some truth to this observation, the uneasiness with the
Korean Wave in other Asian countries also stems from the asymmet-
rical nature of cultural exchange and reception between Korea and
other Asian countries. As Darcy Paquet rightly points out, while Ko-
rean stars are met by enthusiastic fans in other Asian countries, Koreans
often remain indifferent to other Asian popular cultures. In addition,
the uneasiness reflects the kind of concern Korea once had, when it was
fretting over the influences of foreign cultures in Korea. However,
complacent nationalistic discourses have meant that, while Korean
teenagers who wanted to imitate Rambo in the 1980s were ‘‘off-springs
of neo-colonialism,’’ Vietnamese teenagers now following Korean ac-
tors’ hairstyles are largely viewed as consumers of Korean brands (Pak).
With the perceived and real spin-offs of the Korean Wave, the
Korean government has also happily jumped on the Korean Wave
bandwagon, implementing various measures to advance Korean pop-
ular culture and reap economic benefits from it. For example, the Korea
National Tourism Organization under the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism has been busy bringing the Korean Wave and tourism in-
dustry together. It has appointed the Korean Wave stars as tourism
ambassadors of Korea and opened the Korean Entertainment Hall of
Fame in September 2004, while at the same time hosting events for
overseas fan clubs of Korean stars in order to sustain the Korean Wave.
It even asked producers of TV dramas to build more durable sets at
scenic locations, which can be later used as tourist attractions (Demick
A5). Meanwhile, the Korean Overseas Information Service gave Winter
Sonata to the Egyptian Radio & TV Union in 2004, hoping to foster
not only goodwill toward Korean soldiers stationed in northern Iraq,
but also as an opening for the Korean Wave in the Middle East (Onishi,
‘‘Roll Over’’ A3). The Korean Broadcasting Commission sent delega-
tions to India, Thailand, and Indonesia in May 2005 to promote the
Korean Wave in regions where it was relatively unknown.
The most ambitious move to capitalize on the Korean Wave, how-
ever, is the plan by the Kyonggi provincial government to build a
US$1.9 billion theme park called ‘‘Hallyu-wood’’ (combination of
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‘‘Hallyu,’’ the Korean word for the Korean Wave, and Hollywood) just
northwest of Seoul. Positing a need for a place that ‘‘celebrates Asian
entertainment and stands a world away from US-dominated pop cul-
ture,’’ Sohn Hak-kyu, the governor of Kyonggi province, hopes that
Hallyu-wood will ultimately create an East Asian culture which can
compete with western culture represented by Hollywood (‘‘Hally-
wood’’). Despite this rhetoric of confrontation, Hallyu-wood is in fact
the outcome of the Korean government’s plan to develop the tourism
industry modeled after western theme parks (Russell, ‘‘Korea’’ 12).
With the Korean Wave unexpectedly drawing people in, the govern-
ment is simply bringing the Korean Wave and the theme park to-
gether, with features like streets, restaurants, hotels, and shops named
after Korean stars.
The Korean government’s eagerness to promote the Korean Wave
should not be surprising at all. This is not just because of general
interest of any government in encouraging the export of their cultural
content ‘‘as a form of cultural diplomacy and for intrinsic economic
reasons’’ (Sinclair, Jacka, and Cunningham 21). In the case of Korea,
the Korean Wave phenomenon nicely dovetailed with the Korean
government’s priority to restructure the Korean economy in the wake
of the financial crisis of 1997 – 98. As China’s low-cost labor has in-
creasingly undermined Korea’s decades-old growth strategy based on
export of manufactured goods, the Korean government has been striv-
ing to steer the country toward a knowledge- and service-based econ-
omy (Burton 4). Thus, aligning the country with cutting-edge
knowledge and service industries—such as IT, biotech, cultural con-
tents, logistics, and tourism—that can generate greater added values
compared with the manufacturing sector has been the ‘‘national man-
tras,’’ a new national growth strategy for Korea (Spaeth and Macintyre).
It is in this context that the Kim Dae Jung administration that
came to power in 1998 designated the media and entertainment sector
as one of the key growth industries in Korea. Echoing the government’s
priority, the Bank of Korea often compared the value created by a
successful film with the number of cars, highlighting the potential
economic effect one film can generate as compared with Korea’s most
staple export.4 Considering this economic significance, the Kim ad-
ministration reasoned that the media and entertainment sector
deserved the same state support that the manufacturing industry once
received (Burton 4). The lift of the ban on Japanese popular culture
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gave added urgency to the rationale for the state’s support for the media
and entertainment sector.
In this context, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism implemented a
five-year plan to build up the Korean media and entertainment sector,
encouraging colleges to open departments related to it and then pro-
viding scholarship and equipment to them (Onishi, ‘‘Long Indifferent’’
12). The state-funded Korean Film Council, revamped from its pre-
decessor Korea Motion Picture Promotion Corporation in 1999, also
came to play a pivotal role in channeling funds to the heretofore
cash-strapped film industry and promoting export of Korean films. In
addition, in 2000, the Korean Culture and Content Agency was
established under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to promote
exports of cultural content. Thus, Norimitsu Onishi of the New York
Times argues that the boom of Korean popular culture was born for
‘‘business and political reasons’’ in the late 1990s (‘‘Roll Over’’ A3).
While globalization is often seen to undermine nation-states and
nationalism with the rise of globalization, the surge of popular na-
tionalism in Korea concerning the transnational advance of Korean
popular culture indicates that forces of globalization are not completely
free from nationalizing impulses. Indeed, pop nationalism in Korea is
an attempt to appropriate transnationalizing Korean popular culture in
a way that celebrates the nation and asserts its cultural prominence.
Moreover, despite all the supposed strictures imposed on nation-states
by forces of globalization, the Korean state is still a formidable catalyst
for globalization. Thus, if globalization has exposed the precariousness
of nation-states, nationalism and national identities, it has been con-
tinuously mediated and shaped by these forces. It is in this context
that Michael Peter Smith argues for ‘‘the continuing significance
of borders, state policies, and national identities even as these are
often transgressed by transnational communication circuits and social
practices’’ (3).
The attempts in Korea to appropriate transnational Korean popular
culture within the nationalistic discourses are not without ironies or
ambiguities. For example, it is ironic to see that Korea, once resentful
of the one-way flow of foreign cultures in Korea, now finds national
pride in the asymmetrical exchange and reception of popular cultures
with other Asian countries. In addition, there seems to be more than an
adequate dose of narcissism in the nationalistic celebration of trans-
national recognition of Korean popular culture and stars. What is never
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mentioned in the nationalistic celebration in the Korean media is that
Jang Dong Gun was one of two covers (the other was a Chinese sports
star Yao Ming) of Time Asia issued in that week. It is very likely that
Jang appeared only on the cover of Time Asia issued in Korea, while the
Chinese athlete appears on the cover published in the rest of Asia.
Moreover, if transnational brands woo Korean talents as their Asian
face, this is because of the newly acquired marketability of Korean stars
across Asia, not some sort of tribute to Korean culture and stars. More
than anything, these examples indicate the localization strategy of
transnational corporations in order to make their products more pal-
atable to Asians by using Asian talents. If there is anything to be proud
of in these cases, it is made possible because Korea and other Asian
countries have become significant capitalist markets that transnational
corporations cannot ignore.
Finally, despite nationalistic discourses, Korean popular culture is
not simply local or national cut off from global influences and context.
As seen above, Korean popular culture has often imitated and in-
digenized American popular culture. In this regard, the planned theme
park, Hallyu-wood, is a telling example. Even when it aspires to be an
alternative to American popular culture, it is not only named after
Hollywood, but also modeled after a western theme park rooted in
American consumer culture.
However, this is not to merely reaffirm the continued hegemony of
American popular culture. As mentioned above, the global circulation
of American popular culture has led to local imitation and indigenizat-
ion in Korea, which have come to unsettle American cultural power.
Thus, James L. Watson argues that, ‘‘by inspiring non-Western com-
petitors to ‘go global,’ American pop culture industries may be cre-
ating the conditions of their own demise’’ (168). Moreover, the rise of
multiple actors and the resulting multidirectional cultural flows has
meant that global culture not only flows out from America, but is
increasingly flowing into it as well, thus complicating the very mean-
ing of ‘‘Americanization.’’
The continued influence of American popular culture in Korea in-
dicates that global elements are already significantly present in the
construction and articulation of Korean popular culture. However, lo-
cal or national Korean popular culture might seem, it is not a closed
site untouched by global forces. Instead, Korean popular culture is one
of numerous sites of the global – local encounter and interaction. What
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makes Korean popular culture Korean in this context is not some
essentialized and unalloyed Koreanness, but rather its appropriation
of and negotiation with global forces. Likewise, pop nationalism in
Korea, while seemingly celebrating ‘‘national’’ popular culture, is in
fact an articulation of Korean popular culture that exists in the trans-
national context. After all, the surge of national pride in Korean pop-
ular culture is made possible by its ‘‘transnational’’ recognition and
visibility. While pop nationalism articulates the continued significance
of the nation-state and nationalism in shaping globalization, it is an
articulation of the nation and nationalism that are situated within and
reworked by ongoing globalization.
Notes
1. In this article, the McCune-Reischauer system is used to Romanize Korean words and names,
except for the names of people quoted from other sources or where there is already widely
accepted Romanization such as Kim Dae Jung and Bae Yong Joon. Complying with the
Korean practice for Korean names, the family name precedes the given name. In the case of
Korean dramas and films, the Korean title precedes the English title and then the English title
is used throughout the article.
2. Since Miramax first purchased the remake right to a Korean film, Chop’ok Manura/My Wife is a
Gangster, at US$950,000 in late 2001, allegedly after watching it even without subtitles, over
12 Korean films have been sold to Hollywood producers for remakes.
3. While it was initially predicted that Japanese films would take about 10% of the Korean
market, they gained just 3% in 1998 when the ban was partially lifted. Even though their
market share increased to 7.4% in 2000, it fell back to 3.2% in the following year. Thus,
despite the success of several Japanese films, Japanese popular culture generally failed to make
the expected huge inroads in Korea.
4. Despite this dramatic comparison to highlight the potential economic gains from cultural
content, the export revenue from cultural contents is still meager compared to that of man-
ufactured goods. For example, while export revenue from films was US$42 million in the first
half of 2005 and computer-games exports were to reach US$480 million in 2005, electronics
exports alone were expected to be over US$100 billion in the same year (Spaeth and
Macintyre).
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